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The free market has considerable appeal: freedom of contract
maximizes liberty and competitive markets pay each input what
it deserves-its marginal product. So the story goes. Barbara
Fried, however, has written a masterful book that reminds us
that these a priori defenses of the free market were long ago de-
molished. A small band of progressives-led by Robert Hale, an
economist teaching at Columbia Law School-developed an espe-
cially piercing critique of standard justifications for libertarian
market policies. Fried's book has rediscovered this critique and
has made it available to modern readers.
Intellectual histories often raise two related questions con-
cerning authorship. First, "Who is the author of particular ideas?"
Fried is particularly sensitive to the possibility that she may have
attributed to Hale the contributions of his predecessors and con-
temporaries. For example, Fried writes:
There is a perhaps irresistible temptation in writing on one
person's work to exaggerate his singular contribution. Like a
light shining on a polished surface, which creates the optical
illusion that random scratches on the surface are arranged
in concentric circles around it... one is inevitably tempted
t William Y. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Jennifer Brown, Barbara
Fried, Bob Gordon, and Brian Leiter all provided helpful comments.
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to cast one's subject as the source of ideas that swirl around
and through him (pp 213-14).
I am not qualified to assess directly whether Fried has fairly
represented Hale's specific contributions to the "Progressive As-
sault,"' but the book displays meticulous research, and Fried is
careful to locate Hale's thought in the context not only of contem-
porary policy debates but also classical political economy. I in-
stead worry that Fried's own views may be influencing her por-
trayal of Hale-that in excavating the gems from the past, she
may have polished them beyond their original luster. This shad-
ing is a particular possibility because Fried seems so sympathetic
to Hale's criticism of laissez faire. Fried, the intellectual histo-
rian, for the most part has kept herself off stage, preferring in-
stead to report Hale's ideas faithfully. This narrative choice is es-
pecially lamentable because the few times when Fried, the theo-
rist, does come forward and set out her own views, they are stun-
ningly acute.2
Indeed, the quality of Fried's own analysis raises a second
question about intellectual histories: "Why should we care about
authorship?" We should certainly care about whether a particular
argument is compelling, but it is far less clear that we should
care about whether'Hale was the true originator of the idea itself.
Beyond the incentive effects that the "proper citation" norm gives
for scholarly innovation, it is often unclear what the payoff of in-
tellectual history should be.3 Indeed, it is unlikely that Hale him-
self would have written (or even valued reading) such a book,4 be-
cause it might have been too disconnected from the core realist
questions of describing what the law is and what it should be (p
14).' Fried explicitly responds to this concern:
1 This is in part because some of Fried's analysis turns on materials that Hale devel-
oped for his Columbia Law School "Legal Factors in Economic Society" course and other
unpublished sources.
' See, for example, Fried's analysis of optimal taxation (pp 203-04) and reservation
prices (p 134).
' There are of course other potential presentist payoffs of intellectual history. Under-
standing in context what forces influenced Hale's thought may help us see ways that our
current thinking has been artificially constrained. I also embrace an "option value" de-
fense of intellectual history. Even if the past knowledge is not currently useful, it may be
beneficial to preserve it-just in case.
4 Perhaps Hale did engage in intellectual biography. A small shortcoming of the book
is that it does not include a bibliography of Hale's work.
' See also Fried (p 13), quoting Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Func-
tional Approach, 35 Colum L Rev 809, 824 (1935) ("Fundamentally there are only two sig-
nificant questions in the field of law. One is, 'How do courts actually decide cases of a
given kind?' The other is, 'How ought they to decide cases of a given kind?").
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The book is primarily a work of intellectual history-an at-
tempt to excavate and restore in its historical context an
elaborate and (in its time) seditious argument about the na-
ture of law and legal rights. At the same time, the excavation
was motivated in part by the conviction that Hale's argu-
ment retains force in the political and intellectual debates of
our own day, particularly those concerning the proper role of
government in economic redistribution (p 28).
It may have been more useful, however, for Fried to use Hale to
confront current libertarian thinking-say, to interrogate directly
Robert Nozick's or Richard Epstein's contemporary arguments.6
Indeed, the thesis of this review is that Hale-in a sustained
argument running through several publications-successfully
demolished several standard a priori libertarian arguments,
many of which still appear in contemporary debates. However,
his affirmative policy agenda was much less successful. Fried
shows that Hale's own affirmative redistribution agenda could
not ultimately be justified by notions of Lockean sacrifice. More-
over, much of Hale's constitutional analysis is innocent of even
rudimentary forms of textualism or originalism. Nonetheless,
Hale should rightfully be remembered for discrediting simplistic
laissez faire justifications. Hale showed that government regula-
tions do not, as a conceptual matter, interject coercion into our
world but rather (re-)distribute the coercion that unavoidably in-
heres in any system of private property.
This review is divided into four sections. The first assesses
Hale's central contributions-his most salient criticisms of laissez
faire as well as his affirmative Lockean proposals to extract pro-
ducers' inframarginal rents. The second section argues that Hale
at times did not follow his professed Lockean convictions to their
natural conclusions. Section three criticizes Hale's applied policy
agenda, noting particularly his inattention to traditional tools of
constitutional construction. The last section assesses the sugges-
tion in Fried's subtitle that Hale was part of "the first law and
economics movement."
6 Fried herself has done this in separate writing. See, for example, Barbara Fried,
Wilt Chamberlain Revisited: Nozick's "Justice in Transfers and the Problem of Mar-
ket-Based Distribution, 24 Phil & Pub Aff 226, 227 (1995) (arguing that the libertarian
concept of 'justice in transfer" does not establish the justice of market-based distribu-
tions).
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I. CENTRAL HALEAN INSIGHTS
Freedom is merely privilege extended unless
enjoyed by one and all.7
Hale's analysis of liberty and its opposite, coercion, form a
central pillar of his thinking. At the beginning of the century (and
continuing to this day) many judges and scholars-including pro-
gressives-believed that government regulations were necessarily
coercive restrictions of private liberty.8 Progressives argued that
certain redistributive restrictions on liberty were nonetheless jus-
tified because they furthered the public good. But Hale, following
Hobhouse and Hohfeld, argued instead that, as a conceptual mat-
ter, the total amount of legal freedoms must remain constant
across different possible regimes (pp 51-54). Property rights im-
pose (through the agency of the state) correlative restraints on
nonowners. Expanding one person's freedom of choice necessarily
restricts other people's ability to choose: if the law gives me the
right to my body, it necessarily denies others this right. Liberty,
in Fried's phrasing, is an "empty idea," because it is impossible
for law to maximize freedom from interference with choice (p 52,
chs 3-4). The formal and necessary conservation of total freedom
suggests that the function of law is instead to distribute a fixed
quantum of formal liberty. The implication of Hale's analysis is
that in any legal system that distributes rights, the notion of true
laissez faire-no government interference with individual
rights-is not even a logical possibility (p 21). As we will see,
while Hale rejected as empty the concept of "negative" liberty-
that is, liberty from government interference-he, like other pro-
gressives, did embrace the possibility that law could further an
egalitarian notion of "positive" liberty that "measure[s] the indi-
vidual's power to effect his or her desires" (p 37).'
Hale adumbrated this startling distributive view of negative
liberty by developing a sophisticated conception of what should
constitute coercion. As with liberty, Hale argued that government
should be seen as a distributor of legal coercion. Fried writes:
"[W]hen the government intervened in private market relations
to curb the use of certain private bargaining power, it did not in-
' Billy Bragg, The Internationale, on The Internationale track 1 (Wea/Elektra Enter-
tainment 1990).
''Hale argued that traditional liberal thought had erroneously assumed that the
government was the source of all legal coercion" (p 17).
' See also Robert L. Hale, Freedom Through Law (Columbia 1952) and T.H. Green,
Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in John R. Rodman, ed, The Political Theory
of T.H. Green 43, 51-52 (Appleton-Century-Crofts 1964).
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ject coercion for the first time into those relations; it merely
changed the relative distribution of coercive power" (p 18).
For Hale, all contracts were as a conceptual matter mutually
coerced: "[E]ach party to [a] contract, by the threat to call on the
government to enforce his power over the liberty of the other, im-
poses the terms of the contract on the other" (pp 55-56).1o There-
fore, government restrictions on freedom of contract cannot be
rejected merely because the government's action coerces one side
or other of the agreement. Fried explains:
[Voluntary market exchanges are] in fact coerced by the
common-law right of property owners and would-be laborers
to withhold their property and labor, respectively, except on
such terms of exchange as they demanded. That state of af-
fairs meant that in intervening in private contracts to limit
one side's right to dictate the terms of exchange, the gov-
ernment was indeed constraining that side's liberty, as lais-
sez-faire proponents had argued. But it was simultaneously
enlarging the sphere of choices, and hence liberty, of the
other side (p 46).
For Hale, government is the source of all legal coercion because of
its ineluctable role in defining property rights."
A particularly important aspect of Hale's contribution to co-
ercion theory concerns his expansion of what constitutes coercion.
Following Holmes,' Hale rejected the notion that the term should
only apply to instances where the coerced party lacks volition-
that is, the ability to make a choice.' For example, in discussing
the poverty of the pure volitional definition of coercion, Karl
Rodbertus observed that "although the contract of labourer and em-
ployer has taken the place of slavery, the contract is only formally
and not actually free, and Hunger makes a good substitute for the
" Quoting Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 Colum L Rev 451,
452 (1920).
" Hale, by redefining the market as a system of mutual coercion, hoped to show that
the ability to extract any price for one's goods or services depended upon the legal right to
withhold them from others" (p 83). Of course, absent property rights some property would
not exist, but Hale believed that a large number of property regimes could still give ade-
quate incentives to produce property.
"See Holmes's discussion of duress in Union Pacific Railroad Co v Public Service
Commission of Missouri, 248 US 67, 70 (1918) (contending that "the fact that a choice was
made according to interest does not exclude duress").
' "he notion lingers on that coercion necessarily implies that the party to whom it is
applied has no volition, as does the converse notion that where he has volition, or the
ability to make a choice, there is no coercion or duress.' The assumption was simply
wrong, Hale argued at length" (p 48), quoting Robert L. Hale, Bargaining Duress, and
Economic Liberty, 43 Colum L Rev 603, 616 (1943).
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whip" (p 47).14 Hale, however, insisted that any pejorative use of
the term rest on some independent notion of what constitutes an
illegitimate threat. As Fried describes Hale's position: "[F]inding
an offer coercive is always parasitic on a prior, implicit determi-
nation either that the coerced party had a baseline entitlement to
be free of such pressure or that the coercer had a baseline duty
not to impose it" (p 59).
The recognition of this "baseline" problem is probably Hale's
most lasting acknowledged contribution to contemporary legal
scholarship-at least judging by continuing citations. 5 Of course,
this broader conception of coercion raises an important question:
What are appropriate morally acceptable baselines for threaten-
ing not to contract?
Hale's response to the baseline problem is a form of egali-
tarianism constrained by utilitarian concerns about retaining suf-
ficient incentives for productivity as well as Lockean notions of
moral entitlement to property for which individuals have sacri-
ficed. For example, the egalitarian/utilitarian strain in Hale's
thinking can be seen in his "tentative," proto-Rawlsian view that
property rights should be distributed
so as to maximize the aggregate real (positive) freedom en-
joyed by society as a whole. The most likely means to that
end . . .was to increase the options available to the least
well-off people in society, subject only to preserving adequate
incentives for the richer members of society to be productive
(p 46).
Just as Hale distinguished between positive and negative
forms of liberty, he juxtaposed two different uses of "coercion"-
the traditional, "empty" definition that was related to his
criticism of negative liberty, and the normative baseline
definition that was related to his notion of positive liberty. Laws
that fail to maximize the constrained egalitarian sense of positive
liberty were coercive for Hale in the pejorative sense. As the
foregoing quotation shows, the utilitarian notion of preserving
adequate incentives exerted a strong pull on Hale, but Hale also
strongly believed in an expansive notion of Lockean desert, which
" Quoting Eugen V. Bhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest: A Critical History of Eco-
nomical Theoy 332 (Macmillan 1890) (William Smart, trans), quoting Karl Rodbertus,
Zur beleuchtung der socialen frage (Puttkammer & Mulilbrecht 1875).
A Westlaw search, for example, uncovered more than two hundred citations to Rob-
ert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol Sci Q
470 (1923), and Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 Colum L
Rev 603 (1943).
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held that private property rights should be commensurate with
"the sacrifice actually incurred" (p 111). In other words, "Lockean
theory (taken seriously) suggested that sellers were entitled only
to that portion that compensated them for the cost of supplying
the goods or services" (p 74).
While Locke's original theory turned on the labor sacrifice of
a particular owner, the progressive "rent theorists" acknowledged
other sacrifices, including the willingness of owners to forego pre-
sent consumption for deferred consumption (which justified the
payment of interest) (pp 118-19). For rent theorists like Hale, any
returns to capital, labor, or land beyond what was a reasonable
compensation for sacrifice actually incurred could be expropriated
by government and redistributed on an egalitarian basis. Identi-
fying Hale as a Lockean "rent theorist"--a term that Fried
coined-is probably the book's most original contribution as an
intellectual history. Fried persuasively shows that the redistribu-
tive policies of Hale and other progressives of his time were im-
plicitly based on this expanded notion of Lockean sacrifice. Rent
theory connects the disparate strands of progressive redistribu-
tive theory of the period and shows its ties to both past political
economy and the modern "marginalist" revolution in economics.
Hale's notion of Lockean sacrifice undergirded not only his
theory of what constitutes just factor prices (wages, interest, etc.),
but also provided a normative baseline for delineating the pejora-
tive contours of coercion in bilateral exchange. Thus, Hale be-
lieved that the unreasonableness of the terms (given the level of
sacrifice), not compulsion, made an agreement "coercive" in the
pejorative sense. Progressives repeatedly analogized to Jacob's
unfair bargain with Esau: "When Jacob made his tired and hun-
gry brother Esau sell his birthright to get some of the pottage
that stood steaming and savory before him, he charged what the
market could bear, but he did a shabby thing" (p 62).16 Jacob's
meager sacrifice of pottage was in no way commensurate with his
return and was thus unjustifiable to a Lockean like Hale.
Hale argued that "existing property arrangements that lais-
sez-faire advocates sought to protect were not deducible from, and
in some instances wholly irreconcilable with, Lockean premises"
(p 73). 17 In particular, for Hale the emerging "marginalist" eco-
1' Quoting Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianizing the Social Order 233 (Macmillan
1912). Hale himself analogized to Jacob and Esau in arguing that markets could be as co-
ercive as threats of physical force (p 57). The story itself appears at Gen 25:29-34.
17 Fried notes that "laws of inheritence, land grants, and government grants of monop-
oly privilege" (p 19) were particularly pernicious to Lockean principles. John Stuart Mill
added that "Itlhe laws of property have never yet conformed to the principles on which the
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nomic analysis did not provide a moral justification for laissez-
faire policies. The marginalist revolution in economics showed
that in a competitive market, "the price of each factor [of produc-
tion] is determined by its contribution to value for the marginal
purchaser (its so-called 'marginal productivity')" (p 126).18 Lais-
sez-faire champion John Bates Clark eagerly gave a normative
spin to this result, arguing that "the market automatically dis-
tributes income to factors in accordance with the ordinary
(Lockean) intuition of justice: 'to each what he creates'" (p 24)."9
The response of Hale and other progressives to the margi-
nalists' defense of laissez faire was twofold. First, Hale criticized
Clark's marginalist analysis as inconsistent with any Lockean
notion of sacrifice:
The "marginal product," Hale argued, formally measured the
value to the purchaser of a given input, not the cost to the
supplier of providing it. In fact, Clark's marginal productiv-
ity theory contained no theory of costs at all. As Hale re-
marked, "the basis of distribution on this theory has shifted
from the earlier basis of 'sacrifice' to that of 'imputed produc-
tivity,' a basis which Clark expressly approves as 'ethical,'
but without any discussion of the grounds" (p 133).2o
For a Lockean, giving "to each what he creates" is not a de-
fensible distributional criterion. For example, applying Clark's
theory to the story of Esau's bargain might suggest that Jacob
deserved to gain a birthright if the marginal product of his sacri-
fice was sustaining Esau's life.2' However, justifying this high
justification of private property rests" (p 90). John Stuart Mill, in Principles of Political
Economy bk II, ch I, § 3 (Longmans, Green 1929), was the first to argue that existing
property rights are not deducible from Lockean principles.
' Fried somewhat surprisingly claims that "[bjy the 1890s, marginal analysis had es-
tablished complete dominance in economic analysis" (p 127). This assertion creates an in-
teresting tension with Robert Lande's analysis of the legislative intent behind the
Sherman Antitrust Act, also passed in 1890. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
Hastings L J 65, 88 (1982) (explaining that "no evidence has ever been found to suggest
that any legislator understood that monopoly pricing causes allocative inefficiency").
' Quoting J.B. Clark, The Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest, and
Profits 9 (Macmillan 1899). Fried argues that "Clark's particular brand of naive apologet-
ics was a source of embarrassment for most mainstream economists" (p 132), but appar-
ently this embarrassment was not sufficient to keep the American economics profession
from naming its most prestigious prize-awarded every two years to the most distin-
guished American economist under forty-after one John Bates Clark.
Quoting Robert L. Hale, Economic Theory and the Statesman, in Roxford Guy Tug-
well, ed, The Trend of Economics 191, 198 (Knopf 1924).
21 Other readings are possible. For example, if Esau's capacity to assess his situation
(and hence consent) was diminished by his hunger, he may (unbeknownst to himself) have
been able to survive without the food. In that case, the marginal product would have been
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"price" in terms of Jacob's productivity (sustaining Esau's life) in-
stead of in terms of Jacob's sacrifice (foregoing pottage) was, for
the Lockean Hale, "shabby."
Second, rent theorists focused on the possibility of supra-
competitive returns accruing not just to participants in uncom-
petitive markets, but also to "inframarginal" producers in com-
petitive markets. Even though price tends toward marginal cost
in a competitive equilibrium, producers could earn substantial
profits on inframarginal units of production. Rent theorists were
preoccupied with the "unearned surplus" going to inframarginal
factors of production:
[Ilnframarginal and monopoly rents... could, in theory, ac-
crue to any factor of production, labor as well as land and
other forms of capital .... [L]abor had no more right to the
surplus value that it generated over its own sacrifice than
did capital.... If anyone had a right to surplus value, the
progressives argued, it was not any particular factor, but
rather society at large (p 27).
So far so good. I agree with Fried that Hale's primary contri-
butions were to discredit any a priori belief in laissez faire. Hale's
analysis demolished as an analytic matter the old notion that the
free market maximized "negative" liberty by minimizing govern-
ment interference (p 46). Likewise, Hale's conclusion that coer-
cion is an inevitable byproduct of private property is compelling
because the government redistributes, rather than inteijects, co-
ercive power when it regulates. Finally, the theoretical possibility
that free market competition could drive factor prices (such as
wages and interest rates) to equal marginal productivity does
not-contrary to Clark's naive arguments-provide an adequate
ground for accepting the distributive effects of laissez-faire re-
gimes.
In the end, Hale conceded that as a pragmatic matter laissez-
faire policies may, by and large, still be appropriate:
Utilitarian considerations might still counsel against wide-
spread intervention in market-based distribution, if the gov-
ernment could not deprive inframarginal producers of rents
without disrupting the return to marginal producers as well.
..."In orthodox economics, the only intelligent excuse for
the profit system is, not that it results in a 'fair' distribution
of wealth-for no sane modern economist could maintain
that absurd thesis-but rather that profits furnish an incen-
less than the price that Esau was willing to pay.
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tive necessary to get the work of the world accomplished"
(p 114).22
After Hale, laissez-faire defenders needed to descend from
lofty a priori arguments to messy empirical issues concerning the
likely real-world response to particular market interventions.
II. THE IMPERFECT LocKEAN
While Hale used Lockean desert theory to criticize Clark and
other marginalists, Hale's own distributional theory departed
from Lockean sacrifice principles in two ways. First, Hale settled
for using "reservation prices," a weak measure of Lockean sacri-
fice. Additionally, Hale (and other progressives) showed insuffi-
cient interest in extracting the "unearned surplus" of consumers.
A. Can Reservation Prices Measure Lockean Sacrifice?
Hale believed that in distributing wealth the law should pre-
sumptively foster equality. However, this presumption was con-
strained both by the Lockean notion of desert and by the caveat
that certain inequalities "must be tolerated to the extent that
they functioned as a necessary spur to productivity" (p 69). Of
course, these two constraints might not be identical. Hale, how-
ever, "argued at length in developing his rent-theory version of
distributive justice [that] both objectives would be satisfied if in-
dividuals were allowed to benefit from any disproportionate coer-
cive power that they possessed only to the extent of a just reward
for the sacrifice their efforts entailed" (p 69). This formulation
suggests that focusing on Lockean "sacrifice" will also give suffi-
cient incentives to produce.
But in practice most progressives took the opposite tack by
proposing regimes that focused on providing productivity incen-
tives and then arguing that doing so would be coincident with
Lockean morality. For example, in analyzing just wages, they
"generally accepted that the minimum price that workers de-
manded for forgoing leisure should be equated with their relevant
sacrifice for moral (Lockean) purposes" (p 136).
Hale had criticized Clark's "marginal productivity" analysis
for having no theory of sacrifice, but, somewhat startlingly, Hale
had no workable theory of sacrifice himself:
[The question of] a normative theory of what ought to count
as cost . . . received surprisingly little attention. Most com-
Quoting James C. Bonbright, 1 The Valuation of Property 409 (McGraw-Hill 1937).
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mentators simply assumed without discussion that "costs"
for these purposes ought to be equated with incentive-based
costs. That is to say, costs should be measured by the mini-
mal price (the so-called "reservation price") that a would-be
worker or saver would demand for forgoing leisure or present
consumption (p 134).2
Establishing laws that give individuals their "reservation
price" is well-tailored to assure the productivity constraint. Such
laws ensure at least the minimum return that an individual de-
mands in order not to threaten credibly to withhold her input.24
But "reservation prices" are poor proxies for Lockean desert.
In an insightful set of pages, Fried levels three devastating
criticisms against the proposition "to each her reservation price,"
showing that these measures may diverge substantially from any
reasonable sacrificial theory of desert. First, updating the views
of Herbert Davenport, Fried shows why reservation prices of
workers are distinct from reasonable measures of sacrifice:
The price that a worker demands for forgoing a marginal
hour of leisure, Davenport argued, measures only the rela-
tive preferences such worker has for leisure and money
(what modern economists would describe as the "marginal
rate of substitution" between the two goods). It says nothing
about the absolute pleasure or pain associated with either
choice. For the artist who "may have enjoyed every hour of
his productive activity, and may leave it... [only] at the call
of some greater alternative pleasure awaiting him," the
choice may be "between pleasant productive activity, on the
one hand, and pleasant leisure on the other; [so that] even at
the margin... there is no necessity of pain cost." Moreover,
for those workers for whom work may be unpleasant, one
cannot deduce the degree of unpleasantness from the price
that they demand for enduring it, as that price reflects only
the relative values that they place on avoiding work and ob-
taining money (p 135).25
" Indeed, it is not clear that Locke's own labor theory was based on sacrifice. See Law-
rence C. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations 32 (Routledge & Kegan Paul
1977) (-The root idea of the labor theory is that people are entitled to hold, as property,
whatever they produce by their own initiative, intelligence, and industry.").
' See Jennifer G. Brown and Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 Va L
Rev 323, 331 (1994) (discussing the relationship between reservation prices, threat points,
and BATNAs (best alternatives to negotiated agreements)).
' Quoting Herbert Davenport, Value and Distribution: A Critical and Constructive
Study 82 (Chicago 1908).
1999]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Davenport's point was not just that reservation prices are
poor proxies for Lockean sacrifice, but that they are likely to
overstate systematically the supposed sacrifice of the rich: "Ac-
cepting the general (post-Edgeworthian) view that the utility of
money declines with increasing wealth, Davenport argued that
the relative reservation prices placed on work were therefore
likely systematically to understate the relative pain that work
entailed for the poor as compared with the rich" (p 135).
Second, Fried shows why short-run reservation prices may
diverge substantially from notions of Lockean sacrifice. As Alfred
Marshall noted, "A great part of a worker's earnings are of the
nature of a deferred return to the trouble and expense of prepar-
ing him for his work" (p 135).26 But because these prior sacrifices
of education and preparation are already sunk costs, they will not
influence "the price actually demanded at any time for forgoing
leisure (that is, . . . the short-run supply curve)" (p 135). The
minimum price that a skilled craftsperson demands in exchange
for her work during an unexpected economic downturn may not
have much to do with the "true" sacrifice entailed in becoming
skilled in the first place.
Third, Fried points out that any concept of sacrifice must at
bottom be parasitic on some belief that an individual initially
owns the item being sacrificed. Ownership is key, for the simple
reason that one cannot sacrifice something that one does not own.
As Fried puts it:
[Tihe notion that people are entitled to what they earn by
the sacrifice entailed in their labor rests on the premise that
people "own" the right not to work at all. One need not go so
far as to advocate slavery to question that premise. One
could, for example, believe that there exists a moral obliga-
tion on every citizen to contribute some amount of labor to
society in accordance with her ability, in exchange for sup-
port from the state determined solely by her needs (p 135).
It is somewhat surprising that Hale did not see that reservation
prices might themselves be a function of the law.
Together these three criticisms suggest that reservation
prices are poor proxies for Lockean desert. While Hale was right
to criticize theories of sacrifice based on marginal productivity,
equating "marginal cost" or reservation price with sacrifice may
not provide a firmer Lockean foundation for distributing social
wealth.
"Quoting Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 831 (Macmillan 8th ed 1937).
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B. Expropriating Consumer Surplus
Accepting for the moment that the use of reservation prices
(or threat points) as proxies for Lockean sacrifice is viable, Hale
and other progressives were still surprisingly unwilling to go af-
ter an incredibly important source of "unearned surplus"-con-
sumer surplus. Fried repeatedly describes Hale as an analytic ex-
tremist who had an "inclination to push [a] point to its logical ex-
treme" (p 19). But in at least one respect Hale and other progres-
sives were willing to leave a lot of unearned dollars untouched.
The "law of three rents" maintained that in an unregulated mar-
ket, labor, land, or capital could each earn returns on inframar-
ginal production that were disproportionate to their sacrifice-
that is, far exceeding their reservation price. Progressive rent
theorists were "formally evenhanded as between labor, land, and
other forms of capital" (p 27)-the unearned surplus of any factor
was ripe for government expropriation. But pushed to its logical
extreme, rent theory should have taken aim at a fourth "rent,"
the unearned surplus accruing to consumers. If the Lockean the-
ory of moral desert only justifies "ownership of that portion of ex-
change value that represented a fair price for the sacrifice actu-
ally incurred," then consumers should not gain some right that
they greatly value for a mere pittance (p 111). In other words,
rent theorists should be as concerned with consumer underpay-
ment as seller overcharging. To put it most provocatively, Jacob
may have done a shabby thing to charge Esau a great deal for
saving his life, but, by the same argument, Esau would be doing a
shabby thing if he had to sacrifice only a small amount for such a
benefit.
To be sure, neither Fried nor Hale are blind to this argu-
ment. For example, in considering optimal public utility regula-
tions, progressives debated the merits of either (a) setting prices
based on the costs of the specific utility or (b) setting prices
"based on the costs to the high-cost producers ... and [ ] expro-
priat[ing] the surplus paid to low-cost producers by an excess
profits tax" (p 196):
Either solution.., would limit the utilities roughly to a fair
return on their actual investment. But the two solutions had
quite different distributive implications. A cost rate base
transferred any surplus value generated by the exchange to
consumers, in the form of lower rates; an excess profits tax
The "law of three rents" was developed by Sidney Webb (p 27) and embraced by the
Fabian rent theorists (p 145).
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transferred it to the government. That most progressives, in-
cluding Hale, saw the two solutions as morally interchange-
able underscores their belief that the core injustice to be cor-
rected by regulation was not exorbitant charges but exorbi-
tant profits (p 196).
Hale, however, did ultimately prefer the high-price-cum-
excess-profits-tax alternative and explicitly defended the higher
prices to consumers by arguing that "'the appropriation would
take away "nothing which equitably belongs either" to the buyer
or the seller" (p 196).28
But at other times progressives were reluctant to extract un-
earned surplus from either consumers or workers. Hale at least
partially recognized this inconsistency with his more general
Lockean morals and attempted a limited defense. In an illumi-
nating passage, Fried writes:
[B]y altering the exchange value of goods or services, the
government did not expropriate surplus value; it merely
transferred it from one side of the transaction to the other.
If, as rent theorists argued, value in excess of cost was a so-
cial and not an individual product, why should the govern-
ment intervene merely to reallocate the surplus from one
undeserving party to another, rather than to appropriate it
for public use? Where (as in public utilities rate regulation)
the beneficiaries were consumers at large, the transfer might
be defended as reasonably approximating the results that
would be obtained by the more cumbersome route of taxing
the utilities' gain and then redistributing the proceeds to the
community .... To the extent that the community would
have redistributed the proceeds of taxation to the neediest
members of society, in which group the lowest-paid laborers
were disproportionately represented, Hale suggested, one
could defend the result as approximating what a system of
pure rent-theory taxation followed by socialist welfarist re-
distributive transfers, would have accomplished (pp 151-52).
Hale thus suggested that one could allow consumers or
workers to retain unearned surplus, if they would have regained
such money anyway from "socialist welfarist redistributive trans-
fers" under a purer Lockean system of tax (unearned surplus) and
spend (redistribute). Of course, to test whether a particular group
Quoting Robert L. Hale, Utility Regulation in Light of the Hope Natural Gas Case,
44 Colum L Rev 488, 527 (1944), quoting Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Co v United States,
263 US 456, 484 (1923).
[66:273
Discrediting the Free Market
would have regained the resources anyway, one needs a theory
for how public funds should be allocated. Rent theory determines
the amount of resources that are available for public redistribu-
tion but not how those funds should be redistributed (p 299
n 251). On this point, Hale (or at least Hale as we know him
through Fried) did not have much to say beyond generalized no-
tions of promoting equality in wealth.
Still, Hale's rationales for not invading consumer (or worker)
surplus are not completely satisfying. While Hale repeatedly
analyzed Jacob's bargain with Esau (or the analogous negotiation
with a drowning man) as a motivating case, he did not assess the
extent to which Esau had a Lockean right to his unearned sur-
plus. The drowning or starving man receives a great benefit in
continued life, but Hale seems to think that it is just for him to
sacrifice a very small price for this great benefit. How does this
comport with Lockean desert?
Hale could reply that society under a mandated low-price re-
gime would merely be letting Esau retain what society would
have given back to him under a purer Lockean system. But why
do we think that society would give back to Esau all the perqui-
sites of being a first-born son? Hale might reasonably argue that
a redistributive policy would have an insurance component that
would insure that Esau was not left destitute after yielding his
consumer surplus from this lifesaving bargain. Even so, an egali-
tarian insurance program would not ensure wealth acquisition
far exceeding that of others in society. Egalitarian redistribution
would instead tend to equalize wealth in society (or at least
within Isaac's family). The general point is that there is no com-
pelling reason to think that consumers (or workers) are the
neediest or most worthy recipients of resources that from a
Lockean perspective should be socially available. The purer
Lockean system would force each side to the transaction to pay
his or her reservation price. Under this system, all of the un-
earned producer and consumer surplus would revert to the state.
The possibility of inframarginal producers is central to rent
theory (because it allows for low-cost producers to earn rents even
in a competitive market). But Hale overlooks the Lockean impli-
cations of inframarginal consumers-that is, consumers who
would have been willing to pay much more than the equilibrium
price for the product. The negative slope of demand curves sug-
gests that at least some consumers value traded goods at levels
substantially greater than the equilibrium price. For example,
even though the marginal consumer may be willing to pay only
$30 to see Michael Jordan play, I am acquainted with some in-
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framarginal consumers who would be willing to pay, if need be,
much, much more. In the case of electrical utilities, it is plausible
for Hale to argue that the "unearned surplus" taxed away from
consumers by the state would subsequently return to them as an
egalitarian redistribution. This is true, because as a first ap-
proximation we might believe that the consumers' individual sur-
pluses from having the convenience of electricity are roughly the
same. But there are many other goods where "inframarginal"
consumers earn far more than marginal consumers. It is implau-
sible to argue that an egalitarian regime would want to tax con-
sumer surplus and then redistribute back widely varying
amounts to individual consumers. If consumer surplus is really
"unearned," there is no reason why-after the state expropriates
consumer surplus-the marginal consumer of Kathleen Battle
CDs, for example, should receive virtually nothing back from so-
ciety while the true enthusiast would be entitled to thousands of
dollars of redistributed income.
In his most Lockean moments, Hale was willing to allow a
high consumer price and then tax away the excess profits, but he
seemed unconcerned with charging different prices to different
consumers (p 196).29 A pure Lockean system would ask each con-
sumer to pay her reservation price for each unit of consumption.
While Hale might have responded that such an idealized system
is unachievable in the real world, we could come much closer to
this ideal than Hale seemed to contemplate. A dedicated Lockean
would want government to facilitate price discrimination by pro-
ducers-in order to extract as much of the inframarginal consum-
ers' unearned surplus as possible-and then tax away the pro-
ducers' excess profits. An inventive Lockean could dream up sev-
eral programs to allow manufacturers to charge consumers dif-
ferent prices. Besides repealing the Robinson-Patman Act,"° gov-
ernment might prohibit resale of products to stop arbitrage from
low-price to high-price consumers. Hale, however, disliked price
' In a less Lockean moment, Hale merely strived for lower consumer prices:
Of the various means available for appropriating unearned incomes, the most obvious
one was to alter the exchange value of goods and services to eliminate the surplus
value. That goal could be accomplished either by altering the background conditions
to exchange in order to equalize the bargaining positions of the parties, or by setting
the exchange price to mimic what the market price would have been had the parties
faced each other with equal bargaining power (p 150).
But contrary to the opening assertion, these strategies did not appropriate unearned in-
comes, but merely redistributed them from producers to consumers.
"15 USC § 13 (1994) (prohibiting sellers from discriminating in price between buyers
when doing so adversely affects competition).
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discrimination without ever confronting its appealing Lockean
properties (pp 196-97)."'
Fried insightfully notes the parallels between Hale's brand of
rent theory and so-called Ramsey (or optimal) taxation:
In order to minimize the efficiency loss from tax-induced dis-
tortions in people's behavior, a Ramsey tax sets tax rates on
different commodities inversely proportional to the elasticity
of demand. That is to say, the less price-sensitive (or elastic)
the demand for a good, the higher the rate at which it is
taxed. The now-familiar efficiency justification for this
scheme is apparent: the less price-sensitive one's desire is for
a given good, the less likely one is to be deterred from pur-
chasing it if the price is raised by a tax. Thus, ideally, the ef-
fect of the tax is to reduce consumer surplus from a given
purchase, without deterring the purchase entirely (pp
203-04).
Fried sees that "a rent-theory tax is, in effect, a Ramsey tax
placed on producer (worker's or saver's) surplus rather than on
consumer surplus" (p 204). But a true Lockean would want to
combine both a Ramsey and a rent-theory tax in order to extract
for public purposes both the producer and consumer surplus. The
theory of Ramsey taxation and the foregoing discussion of gov-
ernment's role in facilitating price discrimination suggest that
regulation capturing both surpluses could be implemented. 2
III. THE IMPERFECT POLICY WONK
At first, it is somewhat surprising that Hale often chose not
to put forward specific policy recommendations. Fried notes that:
"Hale, with the exception of his work on public utilities regula-
tion, was somewhat vague on the shape that legislative reform
" In this passage, Fried lists price discrimination as an unwanted effect of a particular
regulation.
And as discussed above, a true Lockean might want to develop a richer theory of
sacrifice than the flawed "reservation price" or "threat point" approach. In describing the
failings of a reservation price approach, Fried argues that:
(Rient theory replicates the distributive embarrassments of Ramsey taxation, when
(for example) it taxes the $1 surplus value accruing to the worker paid $3/hour, who
(being destitute) would work for $2 if necessary, but leaves untouched the $1,000 an
hour paid to a millionaire, who (little valuing additional money) would not work for a
penny less (p 204).
A true Lockean might want to have government extract the surplus between the buyer's
and seller's true "sacrifice" points which, as the foregoing examples suggest, might be
above or below their threat points.
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should take. That omission will no doubt strike many readers as
a serious limitation in his work" (p 22).
Here was a realist who was often more comfortable engaging
in abstract hypotheticals concerning Esau and drowning men
than focusing on concrete, salient issues of the day. But on reflec-
tion, I believe this reluctance may indicate that Hale understood
where his analytic strengths lay. I find his applied policy propos-
als-and forays into analyzing particular constitutional issues-
to be much less worthy of continued attention.
On constitutional matters, Hale at times adopted extreme
positions that rendered particular constitutional clauses mean-
ingless. For example, Hale adopted a "radical expansion of the
state action doctrine," essentially deconstructing the public-
private distinction in order to make all private acts public (p 87).
The problem here is not just that Hale disregarded what Recon-
struction-era legislators might have intended by drafting the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to apply to
states but not individuals-after all, progressives often viewed
the Constitution as a living" document. But Hale failed to pro-
vide any internal guidance as to where we should draw the line
between, say, constitutionally permissible and constitutionally
impermissible private acts of discrimination. An even more bla-
tant example of his indifference to textual fidelity concerns the
appropriate meaning of the Takings Clause. Hale, the progres-
sive, argued strenuously in favor of a purely positivist view of
property rights to support (among other things) the government's
right to extract substantial unearned income from producers. But
Hale never confronted at what point that positivist view would
run afoul of the Takings Clause (pp 208-09).
Even on nonconstitutional issues, Hale's affirmative policy
agenda has not aged well. For example, his preference for unre-
viewable agency decisionmaking is innocent of any concern with
regulatory capture. He seems to have agreed with the sentiments
of T.H. Green that "[t]he popular jealousy of law, once justifiable
enough, is . . . out of date" (p 38).13 Optimal rate regulation has
moved far beyond Hale's understanding. 4 It would be folly to
base current policy on the details of his thinking.
Quoting Green, Liberal Legislation at 73 (cited in note 9).
Fried also makes the excellent observation that Hale ignored modern issues of risk
in proposing cost-based rate regulation:
[PIrogressive rent theory, at least as applied to financial investments, appeared to be
largely an attack on returns to risk. Hale and other proponents of a historic cost rate
base for public utilities took as given the investors' right to a return equal to the
normal market rate of return on investments. [But] Hale seemed to define "normal"
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Hale's theory of private coercion (based on government allo-
cation of private property) did provide an important new basis for
enlarging the concept of "state action." But failure to enunciate a
limiting principle for either his omnipresent theory of state action
or for his never-present theory of government takings severely
limits the practical usefulness of his analysis. His constitutional
theory and his affirmative reform proposals were substantially
weaker than his more abstract criticisms of laissez faire. If not for
the latter, I doubt whether Hale would have continuing interest
for us today.
IV. THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT
This section takes up an assertion suggested by the book's
subtitle-but rarely alluded to in the text-namely, that Hale
was part of "the first law and economics movement." My purpose
here is not to assess the truth of the statement, but instead sim-
ply to reflect on the connections between Hale and those law-
yer/economists who have followed him. I am embarrased to say
that we have finally come to an issue about which I am margin-
ally competent to comment.
Of course, Fried chose to include the reference in her title be-
cause it is provocative to think that the first law and economics
movement was an "assault on laissez faire." In making this as-
sault, Hale is certainly not a very recognizable forebearer of the
Chicago school. At least with regard to his relative receptivity to
government regulation, Hale's analysis is closer to more recent
law and economics contributions that stress game-theoretic ra-
tionales for public market intervention.35 On the broad questions
of policy, many readers will think that Hale's sympathies skipped
at least a generation or two. 6
Methodologically, Fried categorizes Hale as an institutional-
ist and a realist, but what struck me was the central role that
as the expected return on relatively riskless investments (p 202).
Hale cannot be taken to task for not having independently developed such things as
the Capital Asset Pricing Model. But ignoring issues of risk would likely set prices far be-
low investors' true reservation prices and thus undermine Hale's own stated purpose of
providing adequate productivity incentives.
' See, for example, Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 Stan L Rev 1291
(1990), reviewing Eric Rasmussen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game The-
ory (Oxford 1989); Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randall C. Picker, Game
Theory and the Law (Harvard 1994).
3 However, to be fair, there have been liberal law and economics practitioners from
the beginning of the Chicago school. See, for example, Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Acci-
dents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale 1970) (discussing the goals of accident law
and corrective justice policies such as compensation and deterrence).
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neoclassical marginalism played in Hale's thinking. I don't nor-
mally think of either realists or institutionalists of this period as
focusing on the possibility that in equilibrium various marginal
whatnots will tend to equal one another. On a personal level, how
exciting it is for me to learn about a progressive who wasn't
afraid to take a derivative.
While Hale's normative conclusions differ sharply from the
generally free market inclination of the Chicago school, Fried
shows that Hale's thinking presaged several core contributions of
later law and economics scholars. This is not to say (and Fried is
careful not to overclaim) that Hale deserves credit for the Coase
theorem or the liability/property rule distinction of Calabresi and
Melamed. 5 But in both of these areas, Hale's analysis foreshad-
owed the "theorems" that were to follow.
Like Coase, Hale understood that "any workable scheme of
property rights had to accommodate conflicting uses of other
property" (p 100). Fried explicitly notes this connection: "[I]n a
nascent Coasian analysis that took its cue from Holmes, Hale ar-
gued that as a result of increased economic development, many of
the uses of property traditionally thought to be protected now
conflicted with each other" (p 101)."
Given his focus on rivalrous uses, Hale not surprisingly
seized upon Miller v Schoene, ° the stark property conflict be-
tween the owners of apple and cedar trees that demonstrated "the
impossibility of government nonfeasance in the face of any set of
conflicting rights" (p 102). Hale's approach to Miller highlights
his interest in noncompatible uses, but it is still far from the
Coasean insight that parties might be able to bargain around any
particular rights regime to the efficient result. However, in a pro-
saic example about passengers taking vacant seats on a train,
' Fried's book also taught me that the Fabians (including George Bernard Shaw) were
"Jevonian marginalists" (p 145).
' See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 Yale L
J 1449, 1483 (1991) (quoting Guido Calabresi: "Coase's own analysis was so much more
compelling than mine, and he understood its significance so much more than I did ... that
it would seem that all that was involved was the question of whether one or two people
had the same insight at the same time").
' Fried also notes that "Holmes had pointed out that every tort case ... presented a
problem of conflicting property or liberty interests" (p 103).
4 276 US 272 (1928). In Miller, apple and cedar trees were growing on two neighbor-
ing parcels. The cedars began to harbor a fungus that endangered the apple trees. The law
faced a stark either/or choice of noncompatible uses-it could allow the cedar trees to grow
and sacrifice the apple trees or it could sacrifice the cedar trees to allow the apple trees to
grow. The state ultimately decided to preserve the more valuable apple crop and ordered
destruction of the cedar trees.
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Hale comes closer to recognizing how people will bargain in the
shadow of different possible laws:
At the beginning of the journey there are less than a quarter
as many passengers as there are seats. At that time a rule
which permitted each passenger to reverse the back of the
seat in front of him and occupy both seats to the exclusion of
other passengers would operate equally. Any passenger ex-
cluded from the seats I occupy suffers no hardship; he can
occupy two seats by himself ... If the early arrivals are still
permitted to exclude others from the extra seats that are oc-
cupied, the latter will either have to stand up, orpay the first
passengers for the privilege of occupying even one seat. And
such payments, even though no greater than the value of sit-
ting down, would not reward the recipients for any affirma-
tive acts of service, but simply for not forcing the person who
pays to stand up (pp 92-93) (emphasis added).
This passage reveals that Hale, unlike most legal scholars of
his day, contemplated the ability of others to contract for rights
not initially allocated. Being true to his nature, however, Hale fo-
cused instead on whether the resulting distributional effects of
the law would accord with Lockean desert.
One also sees in Hale's analysis the antecedents of Calabresi
and Melamed's cathedral. As Fried describes:
Hale examined . . . the effect of liability rules on market
prices in involuntary exchanges. The argument is a familiar
one to contemporary legal audiences, in the context of the
differential effects of so-called "property" versus "liability"
rules of tort damages. Anticipating that analysis in its broad
outlines by several decades, Hale argued that the price at
which a nonowner is allowed by law to liquidate a property
interest without the consent of the owner (i.e., in an involun-
tary exchange) sets the outer limit on its voluntary exchange
value (p 84).
Protecting entitlements with liability rules had an obvious
attraction for Hale because it could limit the ability of property
owners to extract unreasonable prices. Esau would never have
had to yield his birthright if Jacob's pottage were protected by a
mere liability rule-at least against the claims of a necessitous
man. Indeed, since Hale saw as "coercive" the property rule right
to withhold one's property from exchange, he was inclined to
sympathize with liability rules that fostered involuntary ex-
changes. If the liability rule damages were set at an amount
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equal to the initial owners' Lockean sacrifice (which, as noted be-
fore, progressives would imperfectly equate to the initial owners'
reservation price), then liability rules could further Hale's vision
of the social good.
Hale was naturally drawn to those liability rules that al-
ready existed in the law, as demonstrated by his early interest in
the classic necessity case, Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation
Co.41 In Vincent, a dock owner's property interest was ultimately
protected by what we now think of as a liability rule. Hale under-
stood the import of the ruling:
As Hale noted,... this decision not only deprived plaintiff of
the absolute right to exclude the defendant but also deprived
plaintiff of the right to exact whatever defendant would have
paid for the right not to be excluded. "The abrogation of the
absolute power to exclude in view of the emergency abro-
gates likewise the power to take advantage of the
shipowner's special needs, just as the power to appropriate
property by eminent domain denies the owner the opportu-
nity to take advantage of the taker's special needs" (p 85).42
Hale played out the implications of liability rules in a number of
contexts. But, as the foregoing quotation shows, his interest
seems always motivated by the distributional qualities of the
rules.
Finally, I found Hale's analysis to presage one of the impor-
tant insights of Michael Spence. Spence has shown that when
firms incur fixed costs of producing different types of products,
competitors will be led to produce the type or quality that is val-
ued most by the marginal consumer-in an effort to induce these
almost indifferent consumers to buy-and ignore the quality
preferences of the inframarginal consumers." Hale, whose
thought as a rent-theorist focused so much on the possibility of
inframarginal actors, was naturally led to an analogous conclu-
sion:
4 109 Minn 456, 124 NW 221, 222 (1910). For the uninitiated, Fried notes that "[tihe
defendant in Vincent had damaged plaintiff's dock after tying his boat to it during a storm
without plaintiff's permission. Finding that necessity justified the defendant's mooring his
boat to the dock without the owner's consent, the court nonetheless held defendant liable
for the loss in value to the dock" (p 85).
, Quoting Robert L. Hale, 1 Legal Factors in Economic Society 115 (3d ed 1940)
(Teaching Materials) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 Bell J Econ 417, 417 (1975).
See also Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons
from Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U Kan L Rev 541, 560 (1995); Ian Ayres and
John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Monopsony Standard for Consumer Pro-
tection, 80 Cal L Rev 13, 40 (1992).
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In an unpublished manuscript written around 1915, entitled
"Defects of the Marginal Utility Measure of Service," [Hale]
explored the possibility that the government could increase
aggregate consumer surplus over the results of the unregu-
lated market by rechanneling resources from goods that gen-
erated low consumer surplus to inframarginal purchasers to
those that could potentially generate high surplus (p 130).
Long before Spence, Hale understood that free market forces may
not drive firms to produce the assortment of product attributes
that would maximize social welfare once we take into account the
preferences of "inframarginal purchasers." Since most consumers
are by definition inframarginal, this insight has important impli-
cations for public policy."
CONCLUSION
Keynes long ago noted that: 'Practical men, who believe
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences,
are usually the slaves of some defunct economist."45 Barbara
Fried's meticulously researched book certainly shows that Halean
thinking has had an unnoticed impact on certain areas of current
legal thought. However, merely pointing out that Robert Lee Hale
deserves more citations than he currently receives would provide
a rather lackluster rationale for undertaking such painstaking
labors. And Fried indeed has larger fish to fry. The book strives to
point out the disturbing extent to which we are not sufficiently
"slaves" to this defunct economist. Although Fried does not ex-
plicitly use Halean thought to take on modern laissez-faire
" Other aspects of Hale's thought have a strikingly modern quality. For example, in a
1931 article discussing how courts should determine market value in eminent domain
cases, Hale identified the following difficulty:
The problem... is that the market price of any piece of property depends (among
other things) on the pool of potential buyers, which in turns depends in significant
part on the extent of potential buyers' legal rights to circumvent the market....
rT]he court must implicitly decide whether to include the taker in the hypothetical
market of potential buyers, and if so, whether to endow the taker with the power of
eminent domain. If the taker is excluded from the hypothetical market entirely, or
... is included but given the power of taking by eminent domain at a market value
determined without regard to the taker's presence in the market, the market-clearing
price should reflect none of the property's idiosyncratic value to the taker (pp 84-85).
Fried's parsing of Hale seems to identify the fixed point problem that can arise when the
law seeks to determine a market value which in turn is a function of the law itself. See
Robert L. Hale, Value to the Taker in Condemnation Cases, 31 Colum L Rev 1 (1931).
' John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 383
(Macmillan 1936).
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extremists, this is the book's most significant contribution to con-
temporary debates. The widely held current belief that policy-
makers often need to trade off "liberty" and "equality" ignores the
Halean demonstration that law cannot affect the total amount of
negative liberty (it merely distributes a fixed quantum). Or, more
basically, the continuing connotation that a "free" market or
"laissez-faire" policy imply less governmental interference than,
say, usury laws, ignores Hale's demonstration that the govern-
ment's coercive force necessarily lays behind any regime of pri-
vate property. Hale did not undermine the possibility that free
markets could often or even normally foster the social good, but
he persuasively showed that simple a priori arguments that the
free market was necessarily better than redistributive regulation
could not withstand scrutiny. In Hale's own words: "There may be
sound reasons of economic policy to justify all the economic ine-
qualities that flow from unequal rights. [But if so] these reasons
must be more specific than a broad policy of private property and
freedom of contract" (p 20)." This is a lesson that bears repeating.
Quoting Hale, 43 Colum L Rev at 628 (cited in note 13).
